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On Getting People to Cooperate When Facing 
a Social Dilemma: Moralizing Helps 
In a large battle, each individual soldier may reason that he 
is best off if he takes no risks; for that way he assures his own 
personal survival, while the effect of his decision on the outcome 
of the battle is minimal. Yet, if all the soldiers reason that way, 
the result will be a rout; and all would then be worse off than they 
would have been had they all been willing to take risks. 
The above example illustrates social dilemmas. Briefly, a social 
dilemma occurs when (i) each individual reasons that he or she is 
best off defecting from the group effort no matter what other people 
in the group do, yet (ii) everyone is better off if all cooperate 
than if all defect (Dawes, 1975). Other examples of social dilennnas 
may be found in the decision to pollute (one might save considerable 
money while making a negligible contribution to the overall pollution 
problem), the decision in agrarian societies to have as many children 
as possible, the decision to cheat on income tax returns, and the 
decision to "rip-off" large organizations. 
Recently, Dawes {1975) has devised an experimental paradigm 
for studying reactions to social dilemmas, and an extensive series 
of,~studies has been conducted by Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee {1976) 
to determine what factors affect the decision to cooperate or defect 
in a social dilemma situation. The paradi~ involves offering 
subjects in a group the choice of either ,earn.in~: a small amount of 
1 
money with no fine to any other group member or receiving a large 
amount of money with an equivalent fine spread out equally among 
all members of the group. For example, in the studies reported 
by Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee, groups typically consisted of eight 
subjects. Each group member could make either a cooperative 
choice of .~ea~g $2.50 for participation with no fine to any group 
member~or a defecting choice of ~n,tng :~ $12 with a $1.50 fine to 
each group member including themselves. Thus, each subject was $8 
better off defecting ($12.00 - $1.50 - $2.50)-; ·yet, if.all members 
chose the defecting choice, none would receive anything~because 
the eight fines of $1.50 exactly matched the $12 for defecting. 
Subjects viewed this task with extreme seriousness. 
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Several factors influencing choice were discovered. One was 
communication. When subjects were allowed·-to communicate with one 
another, the rate of cooperation was three times that of subjects 
who were not allowed to communicate (approximately 75% versus 25%). 
Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee had initially hypothesized that communi-
cation might result in subjects committing themselves to cooperate; 
yet a condition in which subjects were required to make a non-binding 
announcement of their intentions to the group elicited no more coop-
eration than did a condition in which· ~subjects merely discussed the problem 
and were in fact prohibited from making such a commitment. Thus. it 
appeared that communicatfc()n about ~ problem in and or itself was 
the important variable. 
One informal observation made during these studies was that 
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subjects often brought up the moral and ethical implications of the 
two choices when discussing them. For example, statements such as 
"if you fink out on the rest of us you are going to have to live 
with this for the rest of your life" were not at all uncommon. 
Evidence that such moral exhortation may in fact work can be found 
in a field study by Schwa~z and Orleans (1973). These authors 
interviewed taxpayers a month before the filing deadline; the ques-
tions in the interviews emphasized either the positive moral aspect& 
of paying taxes--e.g., good citizenship~or the legal sanctions for 
nonpayment. Those taxpayers who had received an interview emphasizing 
morality paicl an average of $243 more than they had the previous year 
while those receiving the sanction interview paid an average of only 
$11 more. {Two control groups paid an average of $40 and $57 less.) 
Thus, if moralizing works to control behavior in social dilemma~ 
situations, both inside the laboratory and in a field setting, the 
experimenters themselves should be able to increase cooperative be-
havior by emphasiEing moral and ethical concerns, even though the 
subjects themselves are unable to communicate with one another. 
The following two experiments are devoted to testing the hypothesis 
that moral exhortation might in fact be effective in controlling 
responses to a social dilemma. 
Experiment 1 
The same game was used as in Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee (1976). 
Subjects were not allowed to communicate with each other. In a 
control condition, the results of placing an O {the cooperative 
-
response) or an X {the defecting response) on the piece of paper 
were explained, while in the experimentai ("morality") condition, 
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the experimenter read a rather extensive statement about the group . . 
versus individual welfare implications of choosing the O or the X. 
As in previous research, all decisions were made in private, and 
were never revealed to other group members. Of course. each group 
member could determine from his or her payoff how many people had 
cooperated or defected. 
Method 
Subjects, 73 females and 70 males, responded to newspaper ads 
indicating-that they could receive anything from nothing to $10.SO 
for participation in a psychological experiment. Subjects were 
recruited in groups of 8. each group being randomly assigned to the 
control or the morality condition until there were 10 groups in each. 
When less than eight subjects arrived, the payoffs were modified 
appropriately. For example, if 6 subjects arrived, the payoff tor 
defection (placing the X response) was $9 rather than $12, again 
with $1.50 fine to each participant. In all, there were six groups 
of 6 subjects, five of 6 and nine_of 8. 
The morality condition read as fgllows: 
Many decisions we make in society today involve a choice 
between individual gain and group welfare. It is, for 
example, to each individual's self interest to exploit 
the environment, since any gain accrues directly to the 
exploiter and the loss is shared by all members of the 
society. But, if everyone were to behave similarly, it 
would lead to rapid destruction of the--.world's resources. 
Thus. everyone is better off if everyone cooperates in 
protecting the environment than if each were to choose 
for his or her own gain. Consider. for example, the dynamics 
of the whaling industry. Each whaler has an individual 
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incentive to kill whales since he gets all the profit 
from the sale of meat, oil, and other whale byproducts. 
But at the same time, the whale population is decreased. 
threatening the survival of the species. Thus, that whaler'• 
actions may cause the group to lose a valuable and fas-
cinating species. Only if everyone cooperates in protecting 
whales will such a result be averted. In many other social 
decisions, the welfare of the group similarly depends 
on our laying aside our individual interests and cooper-
ating with. others for the group's welfare. 
This is a study of ethical behavior in a similar 
social dilemma. In this experiment, we're interested in 
your choice in a decision between own gain and group 
welfare. We'd like you to consider the ethical implica-
tions of your behavior before deciding on your course of 
action today. 
This table (Table 1) indicates the possible consequen-
ces of the decision each of you will be asked to make. 
You must decide whether to choose an X or an O. As you 
will see, the X choice exploits the group, while the 0 
choice is cooperative. You will have to mark an X or an 0 
on a card in private. If you cooperate by choosing O, 
you will earn $2.50 minus a $1.50 fine for every person 
who exploits the group by choosing an X. If you decide 
to exploit the group by choosing an X. you will earn $12.00 
minus $1.50 for each exploiter, including yourself, who 
chooses an X. However, as you can see in the table, 
your payoffs do not go below zero. By looking at the second 
row of payoffs in the table, for example, you can see that 
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Payoff Matrix 
Payoff to X Number Choosing Payoff to 0 
X 0 
0 8 2.50 
10.so 1 7 1.00 
9.00 2 6 -0-
7.50 3 5 -0-
6.00 4 4 -o-
4.50 5 3 -o-
3.00 6 2 -0-
1.50 7 1 -0-
0.00 8 0 -0-
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if 7 of you cooperate by choosing O and 1 of you exploit• 
the group by choosing X, then those choosing O will earn 
$1.00 and the one choosing X will earn $10.50. Or, on 
the third row, if 6 of you cooperate and 2 of you exploit, 
then those choosing O earn $0.00 and those choosing X get 
$9.00. 
If everyone chooses O, everyone gets $2.50, and you 
can all leave with a fair share of the payment and the 
good feeling that you all cooperated for the group's 
welfare. Each time a person chooses X, that person decreases 
the assets of the group, since every group member is fined 
$1.50 for every X chosen. While the exploiter may enjoy 
a high payoff by choosing X, he or she does so by 
taking money away from the other group members, possibly 
causing the other members to get no payment at all for 
their participation today. Moreover, the person who 
chooses X gets a high payoff only if the other group members 
cooperate by choosing 0. We can see on the last row of 
the table that if everyone tries to exploit the group, 
no one gets any money. 
In sum, there are both risks and benefits to each 
choice. For the O choice, the benefits are that the group 
as a whole is best served, everyone gets a fair share 
of the payment. The risk of cooperating is that others 
might choose X and benefit themselves at your expense. 
The person who chooses X may get a higher payoff, but 
only if the others in the group cooperate. 
If everyone exploits the group, nobody gets any payment 
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for their time invested today. Furthermore, if you decide 
to exploit the group rou'll have to deal with the knowledge 
that your gain was arrived at by taking money away from 
others. 
Your decision today will be totally private and none 
of the other participants in this group will know what 
you decided. You will each be paid and dismissed separ-
ately. Since both decisions and outcomes are private in 
this experiment, you cannot agree to meet after the experi-
ment to split up the payoff. Once you have made your 
decision, you will write your code number and decision 
on the card in your envelope. You will also identify each 
other person in your group by code number, and indicate 
what decision you believe that person to be making. 
You will b~ paid according to your accuracy in predicting 
the decisions of the other group members. After all 
experimental groups have been run, we'll identify the 
most accurate subjects and send them a check by mail. 
Thus, while we'll pay you for your decision immediately 
after:.:this session is over, we'll have to delay your 
accuracy payment until we have evaluated your accuracy 
in relation to that of other participants in the experiment. 
You will make your decision and predictions without 
communicating with each other in any way. I can answer 
any questions that you have. 
As I mentioned before, we're interested in people's 
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decisions in a social dilemma of own versus group welfare. 
I once again urge you to consider the ethical ~lications 
of the choice you are about to make. I'd like to thank 
you in advance for your participation in this study of 
experimental ethics. 
I can answer any questions you have at this time. 
The instructions on the control conditions were identical except that 
there was no discussion of individual versus group benefit. These 
instructions are presented in Appendix A. 
Results 
The average percentage of defection in the morality conditions 
was 37.2. The average in the control condition was 75.8. U~ing 
the group as the unit of analysis, the t-value for testing these 
different percentages was 4.98 (p < .01). 
Experiment 2 
A parallel experiment was conducted at the University of Cali-
fornia at Santa Barbara. There, college students in psychology 
who received experimental credit for participation played a game 
equivalent to a five-person game in which the payoff for the coopera-
tive response was $2 and for the defecting response $10 with a $2 
fine to each group member including the defector. This research 
was conducted by Talarowski (1976), who presented this game in many 
different formats. For purposes of this report, we will average 
across all formats. 
Method 
Fifty-six subjects were presented with 10 decompositions of 
commons dilemma games..:._five of a game in which the cooperative 
payoff was $2 and five of a game in which the cooperative 
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payoff was $2.40. In both games, a single defecting subject would 
cause the payoffs of the remaining four cooperating subjects to be 
zero; in both games universal defection resulted in a net payoff of 
zero to the group. 
Half (28) of the subjects were randomly assigned to a "morality" 
condition similar to Experiment 1, and the other half randomly assigned 
to a control condition. The instructions were read aloud and they 
were also printed on the face sheet of the subjects' questionnaire. 
The morality instructions were highly similar to those in Experiment 1. 
The control inst'nlctions were the same as the morality instructions 
with the exception that no mention was made of the group and indivi-
dual implications of the choices. 
Subjects were paid off by being randomly grouped with four 
other subjects and having a single decomposition picked at random. 
Results 
In the morality condition, 32.5% of the responses were defections, 
while in the control condition, 46:4% were defections (p < .OS). 
Note that here each subject is the unit of analysis. 
Discussion 
The effect replicated at two different locations, using two 
different games, using two different fot:mats. While the results 
at Santa Barbara were much weaker than those at Eugene; the differences 
may be accounted for by differences in format or by (resulting?) 
differences in proportion of defection. The overall base rate of 
defection:-·in Eugene was 52.6% while that in Santa Barbara was 39.5%. 
Of course, it is always possible the differences are a function of 
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geographic location, but we find it highly implausible that southern 
Californians are more cooperative than are Oregonians. 
The important finding is: it worked. Of course, the manipulation 
is a form of "expetimental demand," but that's just the point. Just 
as Milgram's (1963) subjects gave in to the demand to be obedient 
despite strong psychological resistances, ours gave in to the demand 
to be moral despite an $8 motive not to be. 
The exact mechanism by which the moralizing works cannot be 
determined from these experiments, but must be the subject of future 
investigations. For example, moralizing may work by appealing to 
subjects' consciences. Or, alternatively, the moralization may work 
by simply making subjects aware of the consequences of their own 
behavior. The latter possibility is one that deserves much further 
consideration. 
Previous attempts at experimental manipulation in which morality 
was introduced in a fairly subtle manner (in one or two sentences) 
did not work. Here we made the moral and ethical ilnplications of 
the behavior as explicit as possible, and we did so in a highly re-
dundant manner. We do not know the degree to which we could get the 
effect without preaching at quite such length. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the amount of cooperation 
in the morality condition in Experiment 1 (63%) is somewhat less 
than that obtained in the identical situation when 
the subjects were free to communicate with each other (see Dawes, 
McTavish and Shaklee, 1976). Since the conditions were so much 
different, it is not really appropriate to test for "significance" 
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of this difference. It is, however, suggestive; perhaps when people 
bring up moral and ethical considerations themselves, these considera-
tions have more :impact than when they are introduced in what is 
essentially a sermon. 
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APPENDIX A 
This table (Table 1) indicates the possible consequences of the 
decision each of you will be asked to make. You must decide whether 
to choose and X or an (,. YoU'1iill have to mark an X or an O on a 
card in private. If you choose an O, you will earn $2.50 minus 
a $1.50 fine for every person who chooses X. If you choose X, you 
will earn $12.00 minus $1.50 fine for each person, including yourself, 
who chooses X. However, as you can see, your payoffs do not go 
below zero. 
By looking at the second row, for example, you can see that if 
7 of you choose O and 1 of you chooses X, then those choosing O will 
earn $1.00 and the person choosing X will earn $10.50. Or, in the 
third row, if 6 of you decide to choose O and 2 of you decide to 
choose X, then those of you choosing O will earn $0 and those choosing 
X will earn $9.00. 
Your decision will be totally private and none of the other 
participants in this group will know what you decided. You will each 
be paid and dismissed separately. Since both decisions and outcomes 
are private in this expe~iment, you cannot agree to meet after the 
experiment to split up the profit. 
Once you have made your decision, you will write your code 
number and decision on the card in your envelope. You will also 
identify each other person in the group by code number, and indicate 
what decision you believe that person to be making. 
You will be paid according to your accuracy in predicting 
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the decisions of the other group members. After all the experimental 
groups have been run, we'll identify the most accurate subjects 
and send them a check by mail. Thus, while we'll pay you for your 
decision immediately after this session is over, we'll have to delay 
your accuracy payment until we have evaluated your accuracy in 
relation to that of the other participants in the experiment. 
You will make your decision and predictions without communciating 
with each other in any way. I can answer any questions that you 
have. I'd like~to thank you in advance at this t::lme for your parti-
cipation in this study. 
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